

Discussion of “Misallocation due to Incomplete Markets”  
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11th WCWIF

April 2026

# Summary and Contribution

**Question:** How much waste arises from the inability to share risk and smooth consumption?

**Approach:**

- ▶ Debreu-style “distance to frontier” measure  $A$ : max TFP contraction keeping everyone indifferent
- ▶ No social welfare function, no interpersonal comparisons, invariant to utility cardinalization
- ▶ Harberger triangle sufficient statistics: consumption data + EIS +  $r$

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**Key numbers:**

- ▶ Domestic (PSID, 2,096 households):  $\log A \approx 0.21 \Rightarrow \sim 20\%$  of consumption
- ▶ International (32 countries, 54 industries, 1970–2019):  $\log A \approx 0.05 \Rightarrow \sim 5\%$
- ▶ Three orders of magnitude larger than Lucas (1987)

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**What I especially like:**

- ▶ Single ruler across domestic and international: same framework, same triangle logic
- ▶ Cleanly separates efficiency from inequality (eq. 11 vs. Benabou 2002)

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- ▶ Fast growers: should have borrowed against future growth, instead ran surpluses

### **Transitory wedges** (insurance failures):

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Both are “incomplete risk sharing,” but they have different economic content. The structure of the paper’s sufficient-statistics formula allows us to separate them cleanly.

## Comment 1 (cont'd): Decomposing the Misallocation Formula

Decompose each wedge:  $\log \mu_{ht}(s) = \underbrace{m_{ht}}_{\text{predictable}} + \underbrace{\epsilon_{ht}(s)}_{\text{surprise}}$ , where  $m_{ht} \equiv \mathbb{E}_0[\log \mu_{ht}(s)]$ ,

$$\mathbb{E}_0[\epsilon_{ht}] = 0.$$

Note:  $\log \bar{\mu}_h = \sum_t \frac{r}{(1+r)^{t+1}} m_{ht} \equiv \tilde{m}_h$  (surprise terms drop out).

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Substitute into the approximation for  $\log A$  and expand the product. Four terms arise:

1.  $m_{ht}(m_{h't} - \tilde{m}_{h'})$  — deterministic  $\times$  deterministic  $\Rightarrow$  **survives**
2.  $m_{ht} \epsilon_{h't}$  — deterministic  $\times$  mean-zero  $\Rightarrow \mathbb{E}_0[\cdot] = 0$
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Cross terms vanish exactly (by  $\mathbb{E}_0[\epsilon_{ht}] = 0$ ). Only Terms 1 and 4 remain.

## Comment 1 (cont'd): A Clean Decomposition, No Interaction

**Result:**

$$\begin{aligned} \log A \approx & \underbrace{\frac{1}{2} \sum_t \frac{r}{(1+r)^{t+1}} \sum_{h,h'} \omega_h \mathcal{M}_{hh'} m_{ht} (m_{h't} - \tilde{m}_{h'})}_{\log A^P \text{ (Persistent Wedges)}} \\ & + \underbrace{\frac{1}{2} \sum_t \frac{r}{(1+r)^{t+1}} \sum_{h,h'} \omega_h \mathcal{M}_{hh'} \mathbb{E}_0[\epsilon_{ht} \epsilon_{h't}]}_{\log A^T \text{ (Transitory Wedges)}} \end{aligned}$$

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- ▶  $\log A^P$ : **deterministic**. Captures the welfare cost of persistent, structural barriers (e.g., China not borrowing against future growth)
- ▶  $\log A^T$ : **covariance of wedge surprises**. Captures imperfect insurance against shocks
- ▶ **No interaction term** — additively separable within the second-order approximation

## Comment 1 (cont'd): The Allocation Puzzle IS $\log A^P$

**Gourinchas & Jeanne (2013):** “capital flows uphill” — fast growers save more, run surpluses

⇒ Fast growers' wedges are large, persistent, trending — reflecting unexploited intertemporal trade

Excluding China: 0.052 → 0.019; all fast growers (incl. India, SK, Indonesia): → 0.010. But includes *both* persistent and transitory wedges

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A natural next step: compute  $\log A^P$  and  $\log A^T$  directly

- ▶ **Feasible:** same data — only need to separate  $m_{ht}$  from  $\epsilon_{ht}(s)$
- ▶ **Interpreting the decomposition:**
  - ▶  $\log A^P$  dominates ⇒ driven by unexploited intertemporal trade
  - ▶  $\log A^T$  dominates ⇒ driven by uninsured state-contingent risk

## Comment 2: Trade Openness and Deglobalization

The international measure *requires* trade openness. Example 2: as import share  $\alpha \rightarrow 0$ , measured misallocation  $\log A \rightarrow 0$ . No trade means no scope for reallocation, regardless of underlying frictions.

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### An interesting implication for deglobalization

Declining trade shares mechanically force measured misallocation ( $A$ ) to fall. But welfare does not improve. There are two distinct effects:

1. **Frontier shrinks:** Less trade  $\Rightarrow$  smaller  $\mathcal{C}(1) \Rightarrow$  everyone is worse off.
2. **Distance to frontier falls:** Fewer traded goods  $\Rightarrow$  less scope for risk sharing.

$A$  captures the *distance* to the frontier, not the *level* of the frontier.

**Takeaway:** A declining  $A$  post-2020 could mistakenly signal better risk sharing when it actually reflects welfare-reducing deglobalization.

## Comment 3: How Tight Is The Domestic 20%?

The authors provide excellent robustness checks, but structural forces push the feasible distance to the frontier downward:

1. **First-best vs. constrained-efficient:** The 20% is distance to the first-best. If idiosyncratic wedges exist to preserve incentive compatibility (moral hazard/private info), a fictitious planner cannot remove them. A *constrained-efficient* benchmark would be strictly smaller.

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2. **Interest rate endogeneity:** Completing markets removes precautionary savings, heavily raising the equilibrium  $r$ . As Figure 7 shows,  $\log A$  drops by more than half as  $r$  spikes from 0.05 to 0.20.

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**Takeaway:** If we accept the model's fixed boundaries, the 20% is likely an **overestimate** of the attainable efficiency gains.

## Comment 3 (cont'd): The Sensitivities of Going Dynamic

The paper repurposes Baqaee & Farhi (2020) from *static production* to *dynamic consumption* misallocation. The dynamic version introduces new sensitivities:

- ▶ **Discount rate**  $r$  for future triangles (no static analogue).
- ▶ **Information set** for persistent vs. transitory wedges.
- ▶ **The dual role of the EIS ( $\eta$ ):** In the international setting,  $\eta$  is required to *recover* the wedges from real exchange rates.

### The $1/\eta^2$ Explosion

The domestic EIS only scales welfare ( $1/\eta$ ). But internationally, smaller EIS values force the recovered Backus-Smith wedges to explode as  $1/\eta^2$ . The 5% result is highly sensitive to this parameter calibration.

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### The Endogenous TFP Channel (Missing Growth)

- ▶ Literature shows that uninsurable risk directly depresses high-risk, high-reward activities.
- ▶ Without perfect insurance, households underinvest in human capital, entrepreneurship, and hoard capital in safe, low-yield assets.

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**Takeaway:** 20% measures the static deadweight loss. Misses the dynamic “missing growth” that a complete-market allocation would unlock.

# Minor Comments

## 1. Who generates the 20%? A distributional decomposition

- ▶ Proposition 4's triangles are additively separable across households
- ▶ Group by PSID wealth quintile: does the bottom 20% (hand-to-mouth) generate most of the waste?
- ▶ Would connect the efficiency measure to the household heterogeneity literature

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## 2. Purging exchange rate noise from international wedges

- ▶ Exchange rate disconnect literature: real exchange rates contain financial noise that eq. 17 attributes to risk-sharing failures
- ▶ IV approach: project RER onto fundamentals (e.g., relative productivity); use fitted values in wedge formula
- ▶ If  $\log A$  drops substantially  $\Rightarrow$  financial noise, not frictions, was driving the result

# Conclusion

## **Pushing the Methodological Frontier**

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## Shifting Macroeconomic Priors

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- ▶ The domestic misallocation problem is a factor of four larger than the international problem.

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## The Big Picture: Bounding the True Cost

- ▶ *Inside the model*: General equilibrium effects and participation constraints suggest the reported figures are an **overestimate** of the attainable surplus.
- ▶ *Outside the model*: By omitting the endogenous growth that perfect insurance would unlock, the static waste measure is an **underestimate** of the true cost.